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Abstract
Social awareness and social ties are becoming increasingly popular with emerging mobile and handheld
devices. Social trust degree describing the strength of the social ties has drawn lots of research interests in
many fields in wireless communications, such as resource sharing, cooperative communication and so on. In
this paper, we propose a hybrid cooperative beamforming and jamming scheme to secure communication based
on the social trust degree under a stochastic geometry framework. The friendly nodes are categorized into relays
and jammers according to their locations and social trust degrees with the source node. We aim to analyze
the involved connection outage probability (COP) and secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the performance
in the networks. To achieve this target, we propose a double Gamma ratio (DGR) approach through Gamma
approximation. Based on this, the COP and SOP are tractably obtained in closed-form. We further consider
the SOP in the presence of Poisson Point Process (PPP) distributed eavesdroppers and derive an upper bound.
The simulation results verify our theoretical findings, and validate that the social trust degree has dramatic
influences on the security performance in the networks.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, social ties have brought extensive influences among humankind. More and more people
are actively involved in online social interactions [2], [3], and hence social ties among people are
extensively broadened and significantly enhanced [4]. The so-called social ties are usually defined as
the social relationships between individuals [5], such as kinship, colleague relationships, friendship,
acquaintance, and so on [6]. The social trust degree of the social tie is the most basic and fundamental
notion which characterizes the strength of two individuals relating to each other [7]. According to [8],
ties have specific trust degree values describing the strength (i.e., from enmity to kinship) between the
users. The notions of social ties and social trust degrees have drawn wide attentions of researchers
in various fields, including mobile social networks, wireless network communications, and so on. For
instance, social ties have also been studied for cooperative communications [9]–[11]. The authors in
[9] investigated the joint social-position relationship based cooperation (JSPC) scheme and developed
a partner selection algorithm. An optimal social-aware relay selection strategy was proposed in [10]
to maximize the capacity of the network. An optimal transmission beamformer design was considered
in [11] based on the trust degrees to achieve a target rate in a multi-input single-output cooperative
communication network. These existing work concentrates on efficiency and capacity analysis in these
networks. However, the security and privacy of information is a significant issue in social awareness
networks. Due to the openness of wireless communications, the leakage of information is a serious
problem.
On the other hand, physical Layer Security (PLS) approaches have drawn considerable attention
during the past decade to protect the confidentiality of wireless communications. Wyner’s seminal
research in [12] introduced the concept of the wiretap channel and secrecy capacity, and established
a basic theory for PLS. According to the Wyner’s theory, a positive secrecy capacity exists if the
channel quality of the legitimate receiver is better than that of the eavesdropper. To achieve this
target, various PLS communication technologies have been proposed, among which the multiple-
user cooperation technology has been studied intensively. As indicated by the survey paper [13], the
cooperative beamforming (CB) and the cooperative jamming (CJ) are two effective methods to improve
PLS. Out of a bunch of friendly nodes in the network, some nodes are selected as relay nodes and
3other as jammers. Then, relay nodes exploit CB [14]–[16] to assist enhancing the channel quantity of
the legitimate users, while jammers utilize the CJ [17], [18] to degrade that of the eavesdroppers. The
friendly nodes in the cooperative networks have been categorized into relays and jammers in these
existing works. However, most of them assumed that the relays or jammers are selected and assigned
the roles they act (relay or jammer), but did not discuss how the assignment of the roles was made.
Motivated by the above researches, we observe that the social trust degree may play an important
role in cooperative secure communications. The social ties of users reflect their willingness to share
resources in order to help secure communications. The users with high social trust degrees usually
have strong ties and are willing to share resources to help each other for secret communications. It
is reasonable that the strong-tie nodes are more likely to offer communication links than the weak-tie
ones for cooperation. Particularly, in secure cooperative communications, two nodes with high social
trust degrees may have a high probability to establish connections, and to decode or retransmit the
confidential messages without leaking them to potential eavesdroppers. Based on the above background,
the social trust degrees among users can be utilized to assist cooperative communications for PLS.
Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we propose a cooperative relay and jamming scheme
to secure communication based on the social trust degree. The security performance is investigated by
connection outage probability (COP) and secrecy outage probability (SOP) under a stochastic geometry
framework.
A. Related Works
Researches on social ties have been carried out in many aspects to enhance the efficiency of wireless
communications [3], [19]–[23]. Utilizing of social ties has been discussed in [3], [19]–[21] to enhance
the performance of device-to-device (D2D) communications. Abundant frameworks and approaches
based on social ties such as the coalitional game-theoretic framework [3], the Indian Buffet Process
approach [19], several resource allocation policies [20], [21], and so on, were proposed to optimize
the traffic offloading and improve the system capacity. The efficiency and capacity of wireless ad hoc
networks have been improved by exploiting the social ties among users [22], [23].
In cooperative PLS, to achieve a larger secrecy rate, various CB and CJ schemes have been proposed
in [24]–[29]. The joint cooperative jamming and beamforming schemes were proposed in [24]–[26],
4and were further developed to a destination assisted scheme in [27]. Furthermore, the joint CB and
CJ schemes were investigated in hybird networks [28], [29].
So far, there are few works to study social ties among users in cooperative communications for PLS
enhancement [30]–[33]. Zheng et al. [30] studied the secrecy rate and the secrecy throughput under a
multi-hop relay scheme using the average source-destination distance based on social ties. To further
enhance security, both [31] and [32] proposed cooperative jamming schemes based on social ties. Tang
et al. [31] discussed the SOP of a source-destination pair based cooperative jamming game. A jammer
selection scheme based on mobility-impacted social interactions was proposed in [32] to maximize
the worst-case ergodic secrecy rate. When the relays may be potential eavesdroppers according to
their social trust degrees, a cooperative communication strategy was presented in [33] to maximize the
secrecy rate. We note that in these works, the cooperative nodes are either relay nodes or jammers,
and a joint scheme is missing, which means that the secrecy performance can be improved further
by improving the cooperative strategy. Moreover, the social trust degree is merely applied when the
relays or jammers have already been chosen, i.e., the social trust degree has not been exploited to
determine which role of each cooperative node should be categorized.
B. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we propose a hybrid cooperative relay and jamming scheme exploiting social ties to
secure wireless communications in a random cooperative network. The friendly nodes are categorized
into relays and jammers according to their locations and social trust degrees with the source node.
We analyze the COP and SOP to evaluate the security performance under a stochastic geometry
framework. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that applies the social trust degree into
cooperative node categorization and hybrid cooperative secrecy communications. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
i) We propose a social trust degree based hybrid cooperative beamforming and jamming scheme
to secure a wireless transmission under a stochastic geometry framework, wherein the cooperative
nodes are spatially distributed in a two dimensional plane following a Poisson Point Process (PPP).
According to the social trust degrees of the source, the cooperative nodes are categorized into relays
and jammers. In general, the hybrid cooperative scheme is distributed with a low cooperative overhead.
5ii) A comprehensive COP and SOP analysis is performed to evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme. To facilitate convenient results with a sufficient accuracy, we propose a Gamma approximation
method and a double Gamma ratio (DGR) approach to provide closed-form expressions of the COP and
the SOP. In terms of the derivation of parameters utilizing Gamma approximation method, a flabellate
annulus approximation method is also proposed to simplify the complicated integral calculations over
an irregular pattern.
iii) As an extension, we further investigate the SOP in the presence of independent and homogeneous
PPP distributed eavesdroppers, and obtain its upper bound. In the derivation of the SOP with multiple
eavesdroppers, three independent PPPs are contained which makes the calculations untractable. In order
to obtain an upper bound, the discrete expectation utilizing the law of total probability is employed
to approximate the continuous expectation.
C. Organization and Notations
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide our system model with
relay and jammer selection schemes based on the social trust degrees of the source node. In Section
III, we propose a DGR approach based on the Gamma approximation method, which provide general
formulations for simplifying calculations in our analysis. In Section IV, we investigate the COP in
our scheme. In Section V, the SOP with single eavesdropper and PPP distributed eavesdroppers are
analyzed, respectively. In Section VI, we provide the numerical results to verify our theoretical analysis
and illustrate the performance of the proposed scheme. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
We use the following notations in this paper: (·)∗, ‖ · ‖ and | · | denote conjugate, Euclidean
norm, and absolute value, respectively. P(·) denotes probability. EA[·] and DA[·] denote mathematical
expectation and variance with respect to A, respectively. CN (µ, σ2) denotes circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. exp(1) denotes exponential distribution
with mean 1.A(x, r) ⊂ R2 denotes a bi-dimensional disk centered x with radius r, and D(L1, L2) ⊂ R2
denotes an annulus with internal radius L1 and external radius L2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless network over a finite circle area A(o, L2) ⊂ R2. This
network consists of one source s, one destination y, one eavesdropper z, and lots of legitimate nodes.
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Fig. 1: System model.
Each node in the network works in a half-duplex mode and is equipped with a single antenna. Without
loss of generality, we assume that source s locates at the origin (0, 0). The source tends to transmit
confidential signals to the destination node y without being wiretapped by the eavesdropper. To achieve
this target, the source hopes that the legitimate nodes can help complete the secure transmission by
node cooperation.
The location of the legitimate node is modeled as a PPP Φ with density λ. Each legitimate node
has a social tie with the social trust degree of the source, such as family members, colleagues, friends,
and so on. The degree between two individuals is usually modeled by using a value in the range [0, 1],
which is similar to [8], [9], [11], [33].1 We assume that the social trust degree of each legitimate node
is independent identically distributed (i.i.d.), modeled as a uniform random variable (RV) C distributed
in [0, 1]. For a legitimate node, the closer C near to 1, the more the source trust in this node.
1 A classical way of modelling the social ties between two individuals is weighted graphs which can be referred to [8], where each
node represents one person. The strength of the interactions between individuals is represented by the weights associated with each
edge. In further researches, the strength is modelled as a value in the range [0, 1].
7A. Social Aware Nodes Selection
In this paper, we propose a secure cooperative transmission scheme, where these legitimate nodes
help increase the secrecy rate via cooperative beamforming and jamming. We categorize the legitimate
nodes as relay nodes, jammers and dummy nodes according to their social trust degrees of the source
as well as their locations.
• Relay nodes: Intuitively, the relay nodes should have the closest social ties or the most trustwor-
thiness of the source since they may have the permission to relay the confidential signals or even
decode them. Therefore, the most trusted nodes are selected as relay nodes if their social trust
degrees are in [C1, 1], where 0 < C1 < 1 is a sufficiently large threshold. On the other hand, relay
nodes should be close to the source geographically so that the confidential signal broadcasted in
the first cooperative phase will not be leaked to the potential eavesdropper. Therefore, we also
require the relay nodes be located in A(o, L1), i.e., only those legitimate nodes with a distance
less than L1 to the source are possible to be relay nodes.
• Jammers: Jammers are friendly nodes to the source but are not the most trusted ones. They will
not help relay the confidential signal, but transmit artificial interferences to disturb the potential
eavesdropper when the confidential signal transmission is ongoing. Therefore, we set the legitimate
nodes whose social trust degrees are in [C2, C1] as jammers, where 0 < C2 < C1.
• Dummy nodes: Those nodes whose social trust degrees are in [0, C2] are dummy nodes. Their
social connections are not tight with the source. They will not take part in the confidential
transmission of the source and do nothing.
As a result, those legitimate nodes who will help the secrecy transmissions are divided into relays
and jammers according to their social trust degrees and locations, where the locations of the relays
in A(o, L1) and the jammers in D(L1, L2) are two independent and homogeneous PPPs, ΦR and ΦJ
with intensities λR = (1 − C1)λ and λJ = (C1 − C2)λ, respectively. Throughout this paper, we will
use xR ∈ ΦR to denote the relay and xJ ∈ ΦJ to denote the jammer. Such a system model can be
easily found in the scenes like offices, dormitories, labs and so on, where people inside the room may
be trusted so that they are reliable and willing to assistant secure transmission, while people outside
may help transmit jamming signals to disturb eavesdroppers.
8B. Secure Cooperative Transmission Scheme
We assume that all the relays work in the decode-and-forward (DF) mode. During the first phase of
secure cooperative communication, the source s broadcasts confidential signal to the relays in A(o, L1).
In this phase, we assume that the relays can always decode the received confidential information
correctly and the confidential information can be transmitted securely, which is due to the following
reasons. Since the relays are required to be located by the source with a short distance less than L1,
the source transmits with a sufficiently low power, such that the signal can be correctly decoded by
the relays. The signal can not be decoded correctly by the eavesdropper outside A(o, L1) due to the
large-scale pass loss. Such assumption comes from some scenarios where the source user stays along
with several legitimate friendly users in a region, such as colleagues, workmates, roommates in the
workplace or labs. When the source user aim to transmit secure information to a destination far away,
he or she may select the legitimate friendly users as relays in the region according to their social trust
degrees. The security assumption of the source-relay link has also been adopted in [14], [16], [26].
During the second phase of cooperation, the relays in A(o, L1) forward the correctly decoded
confidential information bits to the destination cooperatively. Since the destination is far away from
the relays, the risk of being wiretapped in the second phase increases greatly. Therefore, the jammers
in D(L1, L2) transmit jamming signals concurrently to confuse the eavesdropper. In order to protect
the signal received at destination node y from being disturbed, the jammers near the destination should
keep silence. Therefore, we set a protected zone A(y, LG), i.e., a circle of radius LG centered at y,
wherein the jammers will keep silence during the second phase [34].2
C. Channel and Signal Model
The signal suffers from both small-scale fading and large-scale path loss. We assume that the small-
scale fading is quasi-static following the Rayleigh distribution, and the channel coefficient between
two nodes located in x1 and x2 is denoted as Hx1,x2 ∼ CN (0, 1). The large-scale fading is standard
path loss model d−α, where d denotes the distance and α > 2 is the fading power exponent [35].
2 Destination node y first broadcasts a pilot signal with a pre-designed power. If a jammer received the pilot signal, it is in the
protected zone and it will not transmit jamming signals. As a result, the received signal at the destination will be protected.
9Since the relays are required to be located with a short distance by the source, the relay nodes
that correctly decode the signal s0 will forward it to the destination cooperatively in the second
phase. In this paper, we will consider a distributed cooperative beamforming scheme, where each
relay transmits s0 by pre-compensating the phase of the channel HxR,y and utilizing all its available
power. The transmitted signal of each relay node is sxR =
√
PsH∗xR,y
‖HxR,y‖
s0, where the symbol power is
normalized as E{|s0|2} = 1 and the transmit power of the relay is PR. We note that such a cooperative
beamforming scheme is totally distributed in the sense that each relay do the cooperation with its own
channel state information (CSI) instead of the global CSI, so that the overhead is greatly reduced.
Then, the received signal power at destination node y is given by
T (y) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PRHxR,yH
∗
xR,y
‖HxR,y‖
‖xR − y‖−α/2
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PR‖HxR,y‖‖xR − y‖−α/2
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (1)
Similarly, the signal power received by the eavesdropper is given by
T (z) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PRHxR,zH
∗
xR,y
‖HxR,y‖
‖xR − z‖−α/2
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (2)
When the cooperative beamforming is ongoing, each jammer also transmits an independent Gaussian
interference signal to confuse the eavesdropper. The transmit power of the jammer is Pj . Since
the jamming signals from different jammers are independent, the aggregate interference power at
destination y and eavesdropper z are given by
I(y) =
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,y‖xJ − y‖−α, (3)
and
I(z) =
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,z‖xJ − z‖−α, (4)
respectively, where D denotes the area ΦJ\A(y, LG), and hx1,x2 ∼ exp(1) is the power fading between
locations x1 and x2. Suppose the network is interference-limited so that the ambient noise is negligible.
The signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) for destination y is given by
SIRy =
∣∣∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PR‖HxR,y‖‖xR − y‖−α/2
∣∣2∑
xJ∈ΦJ\A(y,LG) PjhxJ ,y‖xJ − y‖−α
, (5)
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and the SIR for eavesdropper z is given by
SIRz =
∣∣∣∑xR∈ΦR
√
PRHxR,zH
∗
xR,y
‖HxR,y‖
‖xR − z‖−α/2
∣∣∣2∑
xJ∈ΦJ\A(y,LG) PjhxJ ,z‖xJ − z‖−α
. (6)
In order to simplify our expressions, we define dx,y , ‖x − y‖ to denote the distance between the
nodes located at x and y.
III. GAMMA APPROXIMATION AND DGR APPROACH
In this paper, we aim to analyze the COP and the SOP in our system according to (5) and (6) in
Section II. The detailed derivations of the COP and the SOP are provided in Section IV and Section V,
respectively. We will show that the expressions of COP and SOP [36], [37] have a unified formulation
as
P = P (SIR < β) = P
(
T
I
< β
)
, (7)
where T is the signal power, I is the interference power, and β is some threshold according to the target
performance of the system. Such a formulation is widely used in the calculation of the outage in PLS. In
our scheme, T and I have complicated distributions without closed-form expressions of the probability
distribution functions (PDF), which makes our analysis quite untractable. To facilitate the analysis,
in this section, we propose the following two calculation methods, i.e., the Gamma approximation
method [38] and a DGR approach. We first introduce the Gamma approximation method.
A. Gamma Approximation
Gamma approximation is a model approach to approximate the distribution of a RV based on the
Gamma distribution, which aims to facilitate simplified and low complexity calculations. We can
present simplified expressions for the outage probabilities by using the Gamma approximation. For a
RV A¯, we use a Gamma RV A with the PDF
GA(xA; νA, θA) =
xνA−1A e
−xA
θA
θνAA Γ(νA)
(8)
to approximate it, where Γ(νA) =
∫∞
0
mνA−1e−mdm, and νA and θA are derived from the cumulants
of A¯, especially the mean and variance. The i-th cumulants N
(i)
A¯
of a RV A¯ is defined as
N
(i)
A¯
=
diEA¯ [e
wa¯]
dwi
∣∣∣
w=0
. (9)
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The mean of A¯ denoted as µA¯ = N
(1)
A¯
, and the variance of A¯ is σ2
A¯
= N
(2)
A¯
−
(
N
(1)
A¯
)2
. Then the
corresponding function of the Gamma distribution in (8) has the parameters
νA =
µ2
A¯
σ2
A¯
and θA =
σ2
A¯
µA¯
. (10)
Consequently, we can obtain the Gamma approximations GT (xT ; νT , θT ) and GI(xI ; νI , θI) of T and
I in our system model according to (8)-(10), respectively. The details will be provided in the following
sections.
Gamma approximation can be applied to approximately model the sum of several variables with
special distributions, such as the Rayleigh distribution and so on. The PDF of the sum of these variables
is usually complicated to obtain, while the distribution of each variable can be modeled as a special
case of the Gamma distribution [38]. According to the additivity of the Gamma distribution, the sum
of several Gamma variables is still Gamma distributed. Consequently, the sum of such variables can be
approximately modeled by a Gamma distribution. In our proposed system model, the PDFs of (1)–(4)
are untractable to obtain. Fortunately, each item in the sum expression is a special case of the Gamma
distribution. We use Gamma approximation to approximately modeled them, i.e., both the numerator
and the denominator in the SIR can be modeled as Gamma variables. Namely, our objective outage
probability in (7) has the form of a DGR. Next, we will introduce the proposed DGR approach.
B. The DGR Approach
The DGR approach is to provide a convenient calculation of the cumulative distribution function
of the ratio of two Gamma random variables. Given T ∼ GT (xT ; νT , θT ) and I ∼ GI(xI ; νI , θI), we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a ratio Gamma variables is given by
P
(
T
I
< β
)
= 1− q
νTΓ(νT + νI)
νI(q + 1)νT+νIΓ(νT )Γ(νI)
2F1
(
1, νT + νI ; νI + 1;
1
q + 1
)
, (11)
where q = βθI
θT
, β is a threshold, and 2F1 (a, b; c; d) denotes hypergeometric function [39, Eq. 6.455.1].
12
Proof 1:
P
(
T
I
< β
)
= P (T < βI)
(a)
= EI
[∫ βI
0
GT (xT ; νT , θT )dxT
]
(b)
=
∫ ∞
0

1− Γ
(
νT ,
βI
θT
)
Γ(νT )

GI(xI ; νI , θI)dxI
=
∫ ∞
0
GI(xI ; νI , θI)dxI −
∫ ∞
0
Γ
(
νT ,
βI
θT
)
Γ(νT )
GI(xI ; νI , θI)dxI
(c)
= 1− q
νTΓ(νT + νI)
νI(q + 1)νT+νIΓ(νT )Γ(νI)
2F1
(
1, νT + νI ; νI + 1;
1
q + 1
)
,
where (a) follows since T ∼ GT (xT ; νT , θT ), (b) follows from substituting the definition of the incom-
plete gamma function [39, Eq. 6.45] and the Gamma function of I . After some integral calculation,
(c) follows from applying [39, Eq. 6.455.1].
As a result, we obtain the closed-form probability expression through the DGR approach for the ratio
of the signal power and the interference power with the approximated Gamma distribution. Corollary
1 simplifies the calculation of the probability derived from the ratio of two Gamma variables. The
applications and veracity of the Gamma approximation and DGR approach will be discussed in the
following sections.
IV. CONNECTION OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we will analyze the COP in our scheme based on the Gamma approximation and
DGR approach, and provide its closed-form expression.
Connection outage occurs when destination y is unable to decode the signals transmitted by the
relays, i.e., SIRy < β [36]. The COP is given by
Pto = P (SIRy < β) = P
(
T (y)
I(y)
< β
)
= P


∣∣∣∑xR∈ΦR √PR‖HxR,y‖d−α/2xR,y
∣∣∣2∑
xJ∈D hxJ ,yd
−α
xJ ,y
< β

 . (12)
According to (1) and (3) in Section II, for relay nodes at different locations, although ‖HxR,y‖ follows
the Rayleigh distribution, the values of the large scale fading d
−α/2
xR,y are different. Consequently,
13
hxR,yd
α/2
xR,y with various locations xR are independent but not identically distributed. Moreover, the
means and the variances of them are random variables related to the random locations of the relays,
which makes our analysis untractable. The case is similar for I(y). As a result, it is untractable to
obtain the accurate COP. Nevertheless, notice that both T (y) and I(y) are the sums of several Rayleigh
or exponential random variables, which is approximated Gamma distributed. We can apply the Gamma
approximation and DGR approach to facilitate our calculations. We first model T (y) and I(y) using
Gamma approximation.
The parameters of the PDFs of T (y) (i.e. νTy, θTy) and I(y) (i.e. νIy, θIy) derived from (9) and
(10) are given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The PDFs of T (y) and I(y) have the parameters
νTy =
λRQ
2
y(1)
5λRQ2y(1) +Qy(2)
, θTy =
3PR
[
5λRQ
2
y(1) +Qy(2)
]
Qy(1)
, (13)
νIy =
λJ
( ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,y
dxJ
)2
2
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,y
dxJ
, θIy =
2Pj
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,y
dxJ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,y
dxJ
, (14)
where Qy(n) =
∫
A(o,L1) d
−nα
xR,y
dxR.
Proof 2: The proof of deriving νTy, θTy and νIy, θIy are given in Appendix A and B, respectively.
Notice that due to the existence of the protected zone, the shadow integral area D in (14) illustrated
in Fig. 2 is untractable. We now propose a flabellate annulus approximation method to complete our
calculations in (14). As demonstrated in Fig. 2, the area D in the shadow could be well approximated
by the sum of the following three parts: A1 is the area with oblique line, A2 is in backslash and A3
in vertical line is the annulus D(L1, L2) disposing the flabellate area with angles θ. Consequently, D
can be approximated by the area A1+A2+A3, i.e., we can use
∫
A1+A2+A3
f(x)dx to take the place of∫
D f(x)dx in order to complete our integral calculations. Since A1, A2 and A3 are flabellate annulus,
it is quite convenient to calculate the integral in the area A1 + A2 + A3. We name such a method as
flabellate annulus approximation method.
According to (8) and Proposition 1, the PDFs of T (y) and I(y) are given as
fT (y)(xT ; vTy, θTy) =
x
vTy−1
T e
−xT /θTy
θ
vTy
Ty Γ(vTy)
(15)
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Fig. 2: Integral area D and the tractable approximation calculation
and
fI(y)(xI ; vIy, θIy) =
x
vIy−1
I e
−xI/θIy
θ
vIy
Iy Γ(vIy)
, (16)
respectively.
Fig. 3 illustrates the accuracy of the Gamma approximation method. The PDFs of T (y) and I(y) are
compared with the Gamma distribution in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), respectively. The theoretical results
are derived from (15) and (16). The statistical histograms are the simulation results obtained from
100,000 trials. The curves and histograms indicate that the Gamma approximation and the flabellate
annulus approximation approach are quite accurate.
Now both the signal power T (y) and the interference power I(y) in (12) follow Gamma distributions
(15) and (16), which makes our analysis mathematically tractable. Consequently, the closed-form
analytical results of COP is given as the following proposition by applying Corollary 1.
Proposition 2: The COP in (12) is given by
Pto = 1− q
νTy
y Γ(νTy + νIy)
νIy(qy + 1)νTy+νIyΓ(νTy)Γ(νIy)
2F1
(
1, νTy + νIy; νIy + 1;
1
qy + 1
)
, (17)
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Fig. 3: Approximations based on the Gamma distribution for T (y) and I(y): (a) Simulation and theory results of the distribution of
T (y); (b) Simulation and theory results of the distribution of I(y). The parameters are α = 4, L1 = 6 m, L2 = 100 m, d = 60 m,
LG = 5 m, C1 = 0.8, C2 = 0.79, λ = 0.2/m
2, PR = 10 dBm, and Pj = 1 dBm.
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Threshold β/dB
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
Simulation Result
Theoretical Result
Fig. 4: Connection outage probability Pto vs. β for our system, with α = 4, L1 = 6 m, L2 = 100 m, d = 60 m, LG = 5 m, C1 = 0.8,
C2 = 0.79, λ = 0.2/m
2, PR = 10 dBm, and Pj = 1 dBm.
where qy =
βθIy
θTy
, and 2F1 (a, b; c; d) denotes hypergeometric function [39, Eq. 6.455.1].
Proof 3: The proof is similar to that in Section III.
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The theoretical results in (17) and the simulation results are validated in Fig. 4. The simulation
results are calculated as the ratio of the number of connection outage to a total of 100,000 Monte
Carlo trials. In Fig. 4, although these two curves are not quite the same, the maximum discrepancy
between them at β = −19 dB is smaller than 0.1. We can find that the theoretical results are very close
to that of the numerical results, and the Gamma approximation is very accurate, so our theoretical
results can be applied to analyze the COP.
V. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we study the SOP in our scheme. We first derive the closed-form expression of the
SOP with a single eavesdropper. Then we discuss the SOP with multiple eavesdroppers following the
PPP distribution and obtain its upper bound.
A. Single Eavesdropper
The SOP with a single eavesdropper is defined as the probability that the SIR achieved at the
eavesdropper is larger than some threshold βe [36]. Therefore, the SOP is given by
Pso = P (SIRz > βe) = P
(
T (z)
I(z)
> βe
)
= 1− P


∣∣∣∑xR∈ΦR
√
PRHxR,zH
∗
xR,y
‖HxR,y‖
d
−α/2
xR,z
∣∣∣2∑
xJ∈D PjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
≤ βe

 , (18)
where T (z) =
∣∣∣∑xR∈ΦR
√
PRHxR,zH
∗
xR,y
‖HxR,y‖
d
−α/2
xR,z
∣∣∣2. For arbitrary xR ∈ ΦR, HxR,zH∗xR,y‖HxR,y‖ d−α/2xR,z ∼ CN (0, d−αxR,z)
is an independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with variance d−αxR,z. Hence, T (z)
is conditionally exponential distributed with conditional mean PR
∑
xR∈ΦR d
−α
xR,z
, which is a RV as well
related to the locations of xR in ΦR. Consequently, it is untractable to calculate (18). Fortunately, notice
that T (z) has an approximated Gamma distribution, and therefore we can use the DGR approach to
facilitate mathematically tractable calculations of (18).
Firstly, we model the signal power T (z) and the interference power I(z) at the eavesdropper z as
Gamma variables. Due to the exponential distribution of T (z), we can easily obtain the mean and the
variance of T (z) to derive the parameters of the Gamma model. As for the parameters of I(z), we
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will apply (9) similarly to that of I(y). The parameters of the PDFs of T (z) (i.e. νTz, θIz) and I(z)
(i.e. νIz, θIz) are given as
νTz =
λRQz(1)
λRQ2z(1) + 2Qz(2)
, θTz =
PR [λRQ
2
z(1) + 2Qz(2)]
Qz(1)
(19)
and
νIz =
λJ
( ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,z
dxJ
)2
2
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,z
dxJ
, θIz =
2Pj
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,z
dxJ∫
D
1
dαxJ,z
dxJ
, (20)
respectively, where Qz(n) =
∫
A(o,L1) d
−nα
xR,z
dxR. Then we obtain the approximated PDFs of T (z) and
I(z) as
fT (z)(xT ; νTz, θTz) =
xνTz−1T e
−xT /θTz
θνTzTz Γ(νTz)
and fI(z)(xI ; νIz, θIz) =
xνIz−1I e
−xI/θIz
θνIzIz Γ(νIz)
, (21)
respectively. Therefore, according to Corollary 1, the closed-form analytical result of SOP is given by
the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The SOP in (18) is given by
Pso = q
νTz
e Γ(νTz + νIz)
νIz(qe + 1)νTz+νIzΓ(νTz)Γ(νIz)
2F1
(
1, νTz + νIz; νIz + 1;
1
qe + 1
)
, (22)
where qe =
βeθIz
θTz
, and 2F1 (a, b; c; d) denotes hypergeometric function [39, Eq. 6.455.1].
Proof 4: The proof is similar to that in Section III.
Fig. 5 depicts the theoretical results in (22) and the simulation results of the SOP, where |z| denotes
the distance between the source and the eavesdropper. 100,000 Monte Carlo trials are used. From
Fig. 5, we can observe that although the two curves are not quite the same, the maximum discrepancy
between them at |z| = 45 m is smaller than 0.1. We can find that the theoretical curves coincide with
the simulation ones well, and the Gamma approximation is close to our system model, which validates
our theoretical results in Proposition 3.
B. Multiple Eavesdroppers
When there are multiple eavesdroppers located at the annulus D(L1, L2) in the network, we assume
that they are modeled as a homogeneous PPP ΦE with density λe. The SOP with multiple eavesdroppers
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Fig. 5: The SOP vs. different distances |z| of the eavesdropper. The system parameters are βe = 0 dB, α = 4, L1 = 6 m, L2 = 100
m, d = 60 m, LG = 5 m, C1 = 0.8, C2 = 0.79, λ = 0.2/m
2, PR = 10 dBm, and Pj = 1 dBm.
is defined as the probability that the SIR achieved by anyone of the eavesdroppers is larger than some
threshold βe. Therefore, the SOP is given by
Pso = P (∪z∈ΦESIRz > βe)
= 1− P (∩z∈ΦESIRz ≤ βe)
= 1− EΦR,ΦJ ,ΦE
[
P
(
∩z∈ΦE
T (z)
I(z)
≤ βe
∣∣∣∣∣ΦR,ΦJ ,ΦE
)]
. (23)
From (23) we can see that, it is hard to obtain an exact closed-form expression of the SOP with three
independent and homogeneous PPPs (ΦR,ΦJ ,ΦE) mathematically. To achieve tractable and accurate
results, we make a compromise to obtain the upper bound of the SOP.
We first focus on the calculation over ΦE as
Pso = 1− EΦR,ΦJ ,ΦE
[ ∏
z∈ΦE
P
(
SIRz ≤ βe
∣∣∣ΦR,ΦJ ,ΦE)
]
(a)
= 1− EΦR,ΦJ
[
exp
(
−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
P
(
SIRz > βe
∣∣∣ΦR,ΦJ) dz
)]
(b)
≤ 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
EΦR,ΦJ
[
P
(
T (z)
I(z)
> βe
∣∣∣ΦR,ΦJ
)
dz
]]
, (24)
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Fig. 6: Convergence results of (27) for different K when βe = 0 dB. The system parameters are α = 4, L1 = 6 m, L2 = 100 m,
d = 60 m, LG = 5 m, C1 = 0.8, C2 = 0.79, λ = 0.2/m
2, λE = 0.0005/m
2 , PR = 10 dBm, and Pj = 1 dBm.
where (a) follows from the probability generating functional (PGFL) of the PPP, and (b) is derived by
applying the Jensen’s Inequality. We define (24) as Pso, i.e., the upper bound of Pso. Since T (z) =∣∣∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PRHxR,zH
∗
xR,y
‖HxR,y‖
d
−α/2
xR,z
∣∣2 is an exponential random variable with parameter ∑xR∈ΦR PRd−αxR,z,
we can obtain
Pso = 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
EΦR,ΦJ
[
e
− βeI(z)∑
xR∈ΦR
PRd
−α
xR,z
]
dz
]
. (25)
Substituting I(z) =
∑
xJ∈ΦJ PjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
yields
Pso = 1− exp

−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
EΦR,ΦJ

e−βe
∑
xJ∈ΦJ
PjhxJ ,z
d−αxJ ,z
∑
xR∈ΦR
PRd
−α
xR,z

 dz


= 1− exp

−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
EΦR,ΦJ

 ∏
xJ∈ΦJ
e
− βePjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
∑
xR∈ΦR
PRd
−α
xR,z

 dz


(a)
= 1− exp

−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
EΦR

exp

−λJ
∫
D
EhxJ ,z

1− e− βePjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
∑
xR∈ΦR
PRd
−α
xR,z

 dxJ



 dz


(b)
= 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
EΦR
[
exp
(
−λJ
∫
D
βePjd
−α
xJ ,z∑
xR∈ΦR PRd
−α
xR,z
+ βePjd−αxJ ,z
dxJ
)]
dz
]
, (26)
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Fig. 7: The SOP vs. βe with PPP distributed eavesdroppers. The system parameters are α = 4, L1 = 6 m, L2 = 100 m, d = 60 m,
LG = 5 m, C1 = 0.8, C2 = 0.79, λ = 0.2/m
2, λE = 0.0005/m
2 , PR = 10 dBm, and Pj = 1 dBm.
where (a) follows from applying the PGFL of the PPP, since that the locations xJ of the jammers are
PPP distributed, and (b) follows from hxJ ,z ∼ exp(1).
In (26), there is still a PPP ΦR for the relays, which means a triple integral is required to be
performed. This leads to an unacceptable calculation burden. However, since the number of the relays
is Poisson distributed, we can take the discrete expectation to approximate the continuous expectation.
In this case, the law of total probability is employed for EΦR [·], then the Pso is given by
1− exp
[
−λe
∫
D(L1,L2)
K∑
k=1
e−λRλkR
k!
exp
(
−λJ
∫
D
βePjd
−α
xJ ,z∑
xR∈ΦR PRd
−α
xR,z
+ βePjd−αxJ ,z
dxJ
)
dz
]
, (27)
where K is a specific number of the relays and
e−λRλkR
k!
is the probability of k relays. Consequently,
the analysis is simplified through such an approximation.
Fig. 6 illustrates the typical convergence behavior of (27) as a function of K. The dash curve
representing the Monte Carlo simulation results of (26) with 100,000 trials. The solid curve is the
numerical results of (27). From the figure we can see that (27) is convergent to (26) which is the
upper bound of the SOP and stabilizes after K = 10. The convergence rate decreases with increasing
K. The K which stabilizes (27) is related to the value of
e−λRλkR
k!
.
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Fig. 8: The COP vs. β for various social trust degrees C1 and Cq of the source.
The theoretical results in (27) and the simulation results are validated in Fig. 7. K is set as 11
due to the analysis of convergence in Fig. 6. From (24), (26) is the upper bound of the SOP due to
utilizing of the Jensen’s Inequality. It is obvious that (27) convergent to (26) is the upper bound. We
observe from the figure that, the theoretical Pso is verified by the Monte Carlo simulation and SOP in
(27) is the upper bound. The gap between these two curves is due to the following two reasons: 1) the
utilizing of the Jensens Inequality in (24); 2) the utilizing of the discrete expectation to approximate
the continuous expectation in (27).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, numerical results are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed scheme.
Considering the accuracy of the Gamma approximation and the DGR approach, which have been
validated in Figs. 3–5, we only present the theoretical results based on Propositions 2 and 3 for
simplicity. As the legitimate nodes in the network are categorized into relays or jammers according to
their social trust degrees of the source, we firstly focus on the impacts of C1 and Cq on the performance
of the networks, where Cq , (C1 − C2). The benchmark scheme is that the relays transmit without
the assistance of jammers, which is adopted as no jammer assistance (NJA) scheme. Then the secrecy
performance is illustrated versus various values of L1 and LG. Finally, the upper bound versus various
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Fig. 9: The SOP of a single eavesdropper vs. βe for various C1 and Cq of the source and distances |z| of the eavesdropper.: (a) SOP
with different C1 and |z|; (b) SOP with different Cq and |z|.
parameters is provided for the SOP of multiple eavesdroppers. The system parameters are set as the
followings unless otherwise noted: α = 4, L1 = 6 m, L2 = 100 m, d = 60 m, LG = 5 m, λ = 0.2/m
2,
C1 = 0.8, Cq = 0.01, PR = 10 dBm, and Pj = 1 dBm.
Fig. 8 illustrates the COP vs. β for various social trust degrees C1 and Cq of the source. We observe
that for the same C1, a smaller Cq leads to a lower COP. The reason is that C1 and Cq determine λR
and λJ . A smaller λJ is equivalent to a lower interference power, which results in a lower COP. We
also see that for the same Cq, the COP increases with the increasing C1. This is because a smaller λR
produces fewer relays leading to a lower SIR.
Fig. 9(a) plots the SOP versus βe for various social trust degrees C1 of the source and distances |z|
of the eavesdropper. Comparing the curves with the same |z|, we see that as C1 increases, the SOP
decreases. This is because a larger C1 is equivalent to a smaller λR, which results in less relays and
produce a lower SIRE . Therefore, there is a higher probability for performing perfect secrecy, which
leads to a lower SOP. We also see that the SOP decreases with increasing |z| by the comparison among
the curves with the same C1. This is due to the fact that the secrecy outage occurs more frequently
when the distance between the source and the eavesdropper decreases. From this figure, the proposed
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Fig. 10: The SOP of a single eavesdropper and the COP vs. L1 and LG for different βe and β, respectively: (a) SOP vs. L1; (b) SOP
vs. LG; (c) COP vs. L1; (d) COP vs. LG.
scheme has better performance than that of the NJA scheme at |z| = 20 m and |z| = 60 m, respectively.
Since C1 represents the trust degree of the source, we know that the most private message should be
transmitted to the person with a sufficiently high trust degree in order to realize perfect secrecy.
Fig. 9(b) compares the SOP versus βe for various Cq and |z|. By observing the curves with the
same |z|, we see that as Cq increases, the SOP decreases. This is because a larger Cq is equivalent
to a larger λJ , which results in more jammers producing lower SIRE. We also observe that the SOP
dramatically decreases with increasing |z|. As Cq determines the density of the jammers, smaller C2
will lead to more jammers offering intentional interference to improve the security performance. Also,
the proposed scheme performs much better than that of the NJA scheme in both cases with |z| = 20 m
and |z| = 60 m. From this we know that a diminishing social trust degree will disrupt the eavesdropper
more efficiently.
Fig. 10 illustrates the SOP of a single eavesdropper and the COP versus L1 and LG for different βe
and β, respectively. Fig. 10(a) depicts that the SOP increases with increasing L1. This is because the
secrecy outage occurs more frequently when L1 increases producing more relays. From Fig. 10(b),
we can observe that when LG increases, the SOP increases. This is due to the fact that a larger LG
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Fig. 11: The SOP with multiple eavesdroppers vs. βe for different λe and Cq.
leads to less interference causing by the jammers near to the eavesdropper, which leads to a higher
SIRE. We also see that the SOP has dramatic increasing at a smaller threshold βe. Similarly, the COP
decreases with increasing L1 and LG in Fig. 10(c) and Fig. 10(d), respectively. Such comparison on
the SOP and the COP helps the trade-off between L1 and LG.
Finally, Fig. 11 depicts the SOP with multiple eavesdroppers versus βe for different λe and Cq.
The dash curves are the Monte Carlo simulation results, while the solid curves are the numerical
results of (27). For various λe and Cq, the numerical results are the upper bounds which validates the
analysis results in (27). By comparing the curves with the same Cq, we see that the SOP increases
with increasing density of the eavesdroppers. In the comparison of the curves with the same λe, the
SOP decreases when increasing the density of the jammers, i.e., better secrecy performance can be
achieved by increasing jammers.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a cooperative relay and jamming scheme based on the social trust degrees
to secure communications. The security performance is investigated in terms of the COP and the SOP
under a stochastic geometry framework. A DGR approach was proposed to facilitate the analysis
of these metrics and closed-form expressions were obtained. The simulation results highlighted that
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the social trust degrees have dramatic influences on the security performance in the networks. For
example, the private message should be transmitted to the person with sufficiently high trust degree in
order to realize secure communications, meanwhile a diminishing social trust degree will disrupt the
eavesdropper more efficiently. In addition, the protected zone can protect communications efficiently
when the eavesdropper is away from the source. As an extension, we further investigated the SOP
in the presence of PPP distributed eavesdroppers and obtained its upper bound. Such a scenario has
practical interest since can be implemented in offices, laboratories, and dormitories, where the social
trust degree is employed to reflect the willingness of cooperation of the users.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF νTy AND θTy IN PROPOSITION 1
According to (9) and the definition of T (y) in (1), the i-th cumulants of T (y) is given by
N
(i)
T =
d2iEΦR,‖hxR,y‖
[
ew
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PR‖hxR,y‖d
−α/2
xR,y
]
dw2i
∣∣∣
w=0
. (28)
First, we calculate EΦR,‖hxR,y‖
[
ew
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PR‖hxR,y‖d
−α/2
xR,y
]
as
EΦR,‖hxR,y‖
[
ew
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PR‖hxR,y‖d
−α/2
xR,y
]
= EΦR,‖hxR,y‖
[ ∏
xR∈ΦR
ew
√
PR‖hxR,y‖d
−α/2
xR,y
]
(a)
= EΦR
[ ∏
xR∈ΦR
E‖hxR,y‖
[
ew
√
PR‖hxR,y‖d
−α/2
xR,y
] ]
(b)
= EΦR
[ ∏
xR∈ΦR
GeQw
2
]
(c)
= exp
[
λR
∫
AL
(
GeQw
2 − 1
)
dxR
]
, (29)
where Q = 1
2
PRd
−α
xR,y
, G = Γ(1, Qw2)+
√
QwΓ(1
2
, Qw2), Γ(a, b) =
∫∞
b
ta−1e−tdt and AL denotes the
area A(o, L1). (a) follows since ‖hxR,y‖ is independent of ΦR. (b) follows since ‖hxR,y‖ is Rayleigh
distributed, and by applying the PGFL of the PPP we can obtain (c). Now (28) is equal to
N
(i)
T =
d2i exp
[
λR
∫
AL
(
GeQw
2 − 1
)
dxR
]
dw2i
∣∣∣∣
w=0
. (30)
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Consequently, N
(1)
T is given by
N
(1)
T =
d2 exp
[
λR
∫
AL
(
GeQw
2 − 1
)
dxR
]
dw2
∣∣∣
w=0
(a)
=
{
exp
[
λR
∫
AL
(
GeQw
2 − 1
)
dxR
] [
λR
∫
AL
(
2QwGeQw
2
+ 4Qw
)
dxR
]2
+ exp
[
λR
∫
AL
(
GeQw
2 − 1
)
dxR
] [
λR
∫
AL
2Q
(
1 + 2Qw2
) (
2 +GeQw
2
)
dxR
]}∣∣∣∣
w=0
(b)
= 3λR
∫
AL
PR
dαxR,y
dxR, (31)
where (a) is the second-order differential results, and let w = 0, we can obtain (b). Let i = 2, and
N
(2)
T is given by
N
(2)
T =
d4 exp
[
λR
∫
AL
(
GeQw
2 − 1
)
dxR
]
dw4
∣∣∣
w=0
(a)
= 54λ2R
(∫
AL
PR
dαxR,y
dxR
)2
+ 9λR
∫
AL
P 2R
d2αxR,y
dxR, (32)
where (a) is the fourth-order differential results and w = 0. Consequently, by substituting (31) and
(32), σ2T is given as
σ2T = N
(2)
T −
(
N
(1)
T
)2
= 45λ2R
(∫
AL
PR
dαxR,y
dxR
)2
+ 9λR
∫
AL
P 2R
d2αxR,y
dxR. (33)
As a result, we obtain νTy and θTy by substituting (31) and (33) due to (10) as
νTy =
λR
(∫
AL d
−α
xR,y
dxR
)2
5λR
(∫
AL d
−α
xR,y
dxR
)2
+
∫
AL d
−2α
xR,y
dxR
=
λRQ
2
y(1)
5λRQ2y(1) +Qy(2)
(34)
and
θTy =
15λRPR
(∫
AL d
−α
xR,y
dxR
)2
+ 3PR
∫
AL d
−2α
xR,y
dxR∫
AL d
−α
xR,y
dxR
=
3PR
[
5λRQ
2
y(1) +Qy(2)
]
Qy(1)
, (35)
respectively.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF νIy AND θIy IN PROPOSITION 1
According to (9) and the definition of I(y) in (3), the i-th cumulants of I(y) is given by
N
(i)
I =
diEΦJ ,hxJ,y
[
e
w
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,yd
−α
xJ ,y
]
dwi
∣∣∣
w=0
. (36)
Similar to the derivation of (29), EΦJ ,hxJ ,y
[
e
w
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,yd
−α
xJ ,y
]
is given as
EΦJ ,hxJ ,y
[
e
w
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,yd
−α
xJ ,y
]
= exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,y − wPj
dxJ
)
. (37)
Consequently, substituting (37) into (36), N
(1)
I is given by
N
(1)
I =
d
(
exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,y
−wPj dxJ
))
dw
∣∣∣
w=0
(a)
= exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,y − wPj
dxJ
)
λJ
∫
D
Pjd
α
xJ ,y(
dαxJ ,y − wPj
)2dxJ
∣∣∣∣
w=0
(b)
= λJ
∫
D
Pj
dαxJ ,y
dxJ , (38)
where (a) is the derivation results, and let w = 0, we have (b). Let i = 2, N
(2)
I is given as
N
(2)
I =
d2
(
exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,y
−wPj dxJ
))
dw2
∣∣∣
w=0
(a)
=
[
exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,y − wPj
dxJ
)
λ2J
(∫
D
Pjd
α
xJ ,y(
dαxJ ,y − wPj
)2dxJ
)2
+ exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,y − wPj
dxJ
)
λJ
∫
D
2
(
dαxJ ,y − wPj
)
P 2j d
α
xJ ,y(
dαxJ ,y − wPj
)4 dxJ
]∣∣∣∣
w=0
(b)
= λ2J
(∫
D
Pj
dαxJ ,y
dxJ
)2
+ 2λJ
∫
D
P 2j
d2αxJ ,y
dxJ , (39)
where (a) is the second-order differential results. Let w = 0, and we can obtain (b). As a result, by
substituting (38) and (39), σ2I is given by
σ2I = N
(2)
I −
(
N
(1)
I
)2
= λ2J
(∫
D
Pj
dαxJ ,y
dxJ
)2
+ 2λJ
∫
D
P 2j
d2αxJ ,y
dxJ −
(
λJ
∫
D
Pj
dαxJ ,y
dxJ
)2
= 2λJ
∫
D
P 2j
d2αxJ ,y
dxJ . (40)
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As a result, we obtain νIy and θIy by substituting (38) and (40) due to (10) as
νIy =
λJ
( ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,y
dxJ
)2
2
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,y
dxJ
and θIy =
2Pj
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,y
dxJ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,y
dxJ
, (41)
respectively.
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